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Abstract
Background: Drinking water contamination, with the capability to affect large populations, poses a significant risk
to public health. In recent water contamination events, the impact of contamination on public health appeared in
data streams monitoring health-seeking behavior. While public health surveillance has traditionally focused on the
detection of pathogens, developing methods for detection of illness from fast-acting chemicals has not been an
emphasis.
Methods: An automated surveillance system was implemented for Cincinnati’s drinking water contamination
warning system to monitor health-related 911 calls in the city of Cincinnati. Incident codes indicative of possible
water contamination were filtered from all 911 calls for analysis. The 911 surveillance system uses a space-time
scan statistic to detect potential water contamination incidents. The frequency and characteristics of the 911 alarms
over a 2.5 year period were studied.
Results: During the evaluation, 85 alarms occurred, although most occurred prior to the implementation of an
additional alerting constraint in May 2009. Data were available for analysis approximately 48 minutes after calls
indicating alarms may be generated 1-2 hours after a rapid increase in call volume. Most alerts occurred in areas of
high population density. The average alarm area was 9.22 square kilometers. The average number of cases in an
alarm was nine calls.
Conclusions: The 911 surveillance system provides timely notification of possible public health events, but did
have limitations. While the alarms contained incident codes and location of the caller, additional information such
as medical status was not available to assist validating the cause of the alarm. Furthermore, users indicated that a
better understanding of 911 system functionality is necessary to understand how it would behave in an actual
water contamination event.
Background
Drinking water contamination incidents can pose a sig-
nificant public health risk when they are not detected in
time to enact measures to reduce exposures and miti-
gate the spread of contaminated water in a utility’sd i s -
tribution system [1,2]. Several documented cases of
water contamination incidents have concluded that the
monitoring of health-seeking actions pursued by the
general public may have allowed for earlier detection of
contaminated water. Automated surveillance and astute
clinician disease reporting are techniques that can moni-
tor the health-seeking behaviors. This article illustrates
examples of automated surveillance for minimizing the
consequences during a contamination incident.
The Salmonella outbreak in Alamosa County began
with a case report to the Alamosa Public Health Nur-
sing Service on March 6, 2008, leading to the initiation
of a preliminary investigation. By March 14, the number
of cases reported had increased to 19. The epidemiologi-
cal investigation did not find a common food source for
all cases, although several had eaten at a high volume
restaurant where the index case had worked. The critical
piece of information was that of the five infants infected,
all had been fed with powdered formula mixed with tap
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19, 2008, drinking water samples were tested for total
coliform bacteria through the use of a quick screening
test; the results were positive. Though this test was not
confirmatory, city officials decided to issue a bottled-
water order at this stage of the incident. Beginning with
the index case and continuing through April 29, 436
cases from this outbreak were documented. Based on a
multiplier used by the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) which indicates that for every case
that presents for care, another 30 cases are likely to
have occurred, an estimated 12,000 people were affected
during this incident [3]. Automated surveillance may
have resulted in sampling commencing sooner than five
days after the first documented cases and consequences
may have been less severe for Alamosa.
Another instance where automated surveillance may
have provided an early warning of a water contamina-
tion incident occurred during a Cryptosporidium out-
break in Milwaukee, WI. In this case, a nursing hotline
began to receive a dramatic increase in calls for cases of
diarrhea on April 2, 1993 and the local emergency
department had a peak of patients with similar symp-
toms on April 4
th [4]. Five days elapsed before a boil
water advisory was issued on April 7, 1993; over
400,000 people were affected [5]. A retrospective study
of two waterborne outbreaks involving Cryptosporidium,
E. coli O157:H7, and Campylobacter in Canada indi-
cated syndromic surveillance of over-the-counter medi-
cation sales would have provided an early indicator of
contamination [6]. Close monitoring of developing pub-
lic health incidents through a partnership between
health agencies and the water utility can serve to reduce
the timeline for determining whether contaminated
water is the source of an incident and could prevent
additional exposures to the contaminated water [7].
To address the risk of contamination of drinking
water systems, the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) began conceptual design of a multi-
component contamination warning system in 2004,
which culminated in the development of the WaterSen-
tinel System Architecture [8]. Cincinnati, Ohio was cho-
sen as the first city to demonstrate this conceptual
design and deployment of the Cincinnati contamination
warning system was substantially complete in December
2007. The public health surveillance component was
one of the primary monitoring and surveillance compo-
nents implemented under the pilot program. A partner-
ship was formed between the Greater Cincinnati Water
Works and key representatives of several local public
health agencies, including the Cincinnati Health Depart-
ment, Hamilton County Public Health, the Cincinnati
Fire Department, and the Drug and Poison Information
Center. Personnel supporting the component were
responsible for conducting investigations of public
health surveillance alarms produced by automated sur-
veillance systems, and for participating in drills and
exercises which simulated drinking water contamination
incidents. Additional details on the design of the Cincin-
nati contamination warning system can be found
in Water Security Initiative: Cincinnati Pilot Post-
Implementation System Status [9].
During a water contamination incident, public health
officials may expect that health-seeking behavior of indi-
viduals exposed to contaminated water would largely
depend on the timing of symptom onset, severity of
symptoms, and nature of the symptoms. These factors
are a function of the type of contaminant introduced
into the water supply, and are anticipated to have a sig-
nificant impact on how the public would react to an
incident. Some of the expected symptoms following
exposure to a contaminant may include respiratory or
gastrointestinal distress, skin irritation, or neurological
symptoms. The following list includes a variety of
actions that may be pursued by individuals seeking med-
ical treatment for systems developed during an incident:
￿ Call 911
￿ Call a medical help line (e.g., nursing hotline or Poi-
son Control Center)
￿ Drive to an emergency department
￿ Schedule an appointment with a primary care
physician
￿ Purchase over-the-counter medication
Automated surveillance systems which are designed
to monitor any of these public health data streams can
provide an early warning when an established baseline
threshold has been exceeded, signaling a possible con-
tamination incident. To provide robust coverage, a
public health surveillance component designed to
monitor a variety of public health data streams would
be capable of detecting both acute and gradually devel-
oping events. Acute events result from fast-acting con-
taminants that generally have an onset of symptoms
after exposure within ten minutes to three hours,
while one to several days may elapse between exposure
to a contaminant and the onset of symptoms for gra-
dually developing events. The term fast-acting con-
taminant describes any possible water contaminant
that produces rapid onset of symptoms, within minutes
to hours following exposure to an acutely harmful
dose. Since, for purposes of the contamination warning
system, the syndromes monitored are the same for
both acute and gradually developing events caused by
biological, radiological, or chemical contaminants, the
timeliness of anomaly detection coupled with subject
matter expertise during subsequent alert investigations
determines what type of contaminant(s) may be
responsible.
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depicted in Figure 1, demonstrating symptom onset,
actions of an exposed individual, and the unique data
outputs which can be analyzed by public health surveil-
lance systems. The timeline illustrated in this figure is
based on the expected symptom onset and potential
health-seeking actions that would occur following expo-
sure to a carbamate pesticide. Note that Poison Control
Center (PCC) data entry is initiated by poison control
specialists (into the National Poison Data System [10])
immediately upon receipt of a call to the hotline. How-
ever, there is a four-hour latency period between case
occurrence and case upload prior to when statistical
analysis occurs to allow sufficient time for completion
of data entry. Typically, follow-up phone calls occur
after the initial hotline call is received to track the medi-
cal status of the caller. 911 data is entered by call dis-
patchers into the software system immediately upon
receipt, and is available for analysis in approximately
1.5 hours following transmission to the surveillance sys-
tem. Emergency Medical Services (EMS) data upload is
delayed until an EMS unit closes out the record. Emer-
gency department data upload is also dependant on the
time that a patient’s case record is completed and
uploaded for analysis. The bottom portion of the figure
depicts example time delays prior to when data is avail-
able for statistical analysis, based on the four data
sources currently analyzed by automated surveillance
systems within the public health surveillance component
of the Cincinnati pilot. For PCC data, the delay in data
transmission is the time delay for when data is available
in NPDS for statistical analysis.
Prior to building the public health surveillance com-
ponent of the Cincinnati pilot, a gap analysis was con-
ducted to determine whether existing surveillance
capabilities provided sufficient coverage for the spec-
trum of possible water contaminants. One automated
surveillance tool, Real-time Outbreak and Disease Sur-
veillance, was used by the local health departments to
monitor emergency department visits. Real-time Out-
break and Disease Surveillance was designed to detect
gradually worsening public health conditions, such as
the onset of influenza season or a Cryptosporidium out-
break and was later replaced by EpiCenter. While emer-
gency department data surveillance is programmed to
execute on an hourly basis, alerts indicating anomalies
in patient case load will only occur once per day (when
anomalous conditions are present). Data entry specialists
typically upload information from paper records of hos-
pital cases from the previous 24 hours once per day;
therefore, new electronic records often are not available
for analysis more than once per 24 hour period. For this
reason, EpiCenter was not optimal for detecting water
contamination (either unintentional or intentional) with
a fast-acting contaminant. For water contamination sce-
narios caused by fast-acting contaminants, community
exposure would occur quickly, and symptoms would
present rapidly; in most cases, less than 24 hours.
Therefore, an automated surveillance system, capable of
identifying possible contamination incidents due to fast-
acting contaminants, (in a more timely fashion than
EpiCenter could provide) was needed. One of the new
systems implemented consisted of surveillance of 911
calls within the City of Cincinnati.
Figure 1 Example Chemical Contamination Scenario (Carbamate Pesticide).
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department visit data which is commonly used by health
departments for surveillance of possible public health
outbreaks. Data is often more complete since the source
provider consists of a few or even one dispatch center,
rather than many hospitals. 911 data is available quickly,
as the focus is to dispatch emergency services rather
than to diagnose a patient. Additionally, geographic data
provides the exact location of the illness, rather than the
location of the hospital to which the patient was trans-
ported, which could service a large geographic area [11].
Besides improving spatial detection accuracy [12,13],
precise geographic location information is critical to the
response to suspected or confirmed water contamina-
tion. Water utility personnel involved in consequence
management during response to an incident can use the
location data of exposed individuals to identify the
extent of the contaminated area and to trace the source
of the contamination. This paper discusses the design,
implementation, and application of automated, hourly
911 data surveillance for detection of possible water
contamination in the Cincinnati contamination warning
system.
Methods
Data Flow and Configuration
Cincinnati Police Department and Cincinnati Fire
Department emergency dispatchers process 911 calls on
a regular basis through Cincinnati’s Motorola dispatch
system. To improve standardization and electronic call
tracking for 911 calls, a commercial software package,
Priority Dispatch ProQA, was deployed in Cincinnati
[14]. This software package assists 911 dispatchers in
effective triage of calls by gathering a variety of health
data in a systematic manner. The software directs dis-
patchers to assign incident codes to incoming calls
according to the Medical Priority Dispatch System,
which is a standard approved by the National Associa-
tion of Emergency Dispatchers and utilized by over
3,400 dispatch centers in the US. Calls are triaged
according to data elements, including chief complaint
and geographic location (latitude/longitude) of the call.
The caller initiates the complaint (i.e., breathing
problems) and more specific information is attained by
the dispatcher using prompts provided by the software
program. In addition, instructions are provided to the
caller until medical assistance arrives.
When call records are completed by dispatchers, the
call data is stored in the Cincinnati Fire Department’s
dispatch system. Call detail data is then exported to a
utility application server via Web services. Exported call
detail information includes the call identifier, the inci-
dent type code, the date and time of the incident (call
time and dispatch time), and the latitude and longitude
of the incident location. All 911 calls are a part of the
public record and not subject to Health Insurance Port-
ability and Accountability Act privacy regulations. New
call detail records are queried by the utility application
server on a minute-by-minute basis. For call detail
records that have incident type codes indicative of possi-
ble water contamination, as determined by epidemiolo-
gists from the Cincinnati Health Department and
Hamilton County Public Health, and poison control spe-
cialists from the Drug and Poison Information Center
prior to implementation of the system, a corresponding
record is stored in a dedicated utility database for later
reference by the 911 surveillance system. These incident
types initially included symptoms pertaining to abdom-
inal pain, allergies, breathing problems, cardiac or
respiratory distress, headache, hemorrhaging, fainting,
possible stroke, seizures, and unconsciousness; incident
codes including symptoms for burns and blisters were
added later following a call dispatch exercise conducted
by Cincinnati Fire Department. Call detail records for
these incident types remain on the server for only 28
days, after which they are removed. This timeframe
allows for an adequate window to detect any alarms,
which are documented for future analysis. This data
flow process is depicted in Figure 2.
Data Analysis with the Space-time Permutation Scan
The space-time permutation scan statistic was intro-
duced by Kulldorff and colleagues for early detection of
disease outbreaks without requiring knowledge of the
population at risk [15]. The statistic relies entirely on
case location and time data. Essentially, the method
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Figure 2 911 Surveillence System Process.
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method iteratively moves a cylindrical scan window
across the study area, varying the cylinder size spatially
and temporally. At each iteration, the Poisson general-
ized likelihood ratio that the cylinder contains an out-
break is evaluated. Over all iterations, the cylinder with
the highest likelihood ratio constitutes the cylinder most
likely to indicate outbreak. The highest likelihood ratio
does not necessarily mean an outbreak has occurred.
Statistical inference on the probability that the cylinder
is the result of an outbreak relies on Monte Carlo
hypothesis testing to account for multiple testing issues.
For the Cincinnati 911 surveillance system, the SaTS-
can™ software package was utilized to perform space-
time permutation scans of filtered 911 calls in the City of
Cincinnati. SaTScan™ is a free software package for spa-
tial, temporal, and spatio-temporal analysis of data [16].
Prior to implementation of the 911 surveillance system,
911 data from the coverage area was analyzed to establish
appropriate system parameters. Statistical analysis of his-
torical data supported the use of a 21-day data set for the
space-time permutation model. The space-time permuta-
tion model requires older data to evaluate the validity of
the detected cluster. The more data involved in the ana-
lysis, the more confidence (i.e., lower p-value) there is in
the existence of the cluster. At the same time, too much
data may also result in lower confidence in the cluster’s
existence due to a recurrence of earlier dates experien-
cing clustering in the location [17].
To determine the most appropriate amount of histori-
cal data to include in the analysis, SaTScan™ compared
data sets consisting of different lengths of historical data
(four weeks, three weeks, two weeks, one week, six days,
five days, two days). The dates chosen for the analysis
were the three separate dates that had a cluster in the
historical analysis and also generated an alert based on a
parallel analysis of EMS data using the CDC’sE a r l y
Aberration Reporting System [18]. Based upon the
results of the three analyses (each of which compared
the seven time periods of historical data described
above), the most appropriate amount of historical data
for space-time permutation was either three weeks or
two weeks.
The three-week and two-week data sets both detected
the targeted clusters with small p-values and high recur-
rence intervals. The recurrence interval indicates how
often the detected cluster may occur by chance. If the
recurrence interval is three months, then the expected
number of false positives is one every three months.
The three-week analyses had slightly lower p-values
than the two-week analyses, and therefore was the
recommended length of historical data to include in
order to balance statistical significance with the recur-
rence interval.
For the public health surveillance component of the
Cincinnati pilot, analysis of 911 data is executed hourly
and the algorithm executes on a rolling three-week data
set of 911 call detail records each analysis cycle. The
analysis results provide the location and size of likely
event clusters across the entire data set, sorted by the p-
value. The p-value is evaluated over 999 Monte Carlo
simulations.
Alarm Notification
A 911 alarm will only be generated when the alert noti-
fication logic, as established for the public health sur-
veillance component, is met. The initial design included
alerting logic steps one through three below, to elimi-
n a t en o t i f i c a t i o n sf r o ms u b s e q u e n ta n a l y s e st h a td u p l i -
cated recent results. A fourth alerting logic step was
later added to reduce alarms. The current alerting logic
for identifying 911 alert conditions is:
1. If the space-time permutation scan identifies a
candidate cluster with p-value < 0.0250 for a given
day
2. If previous analyses have not already generated an
alert for the exact cluster center identifier (911 call
identifier closest to cluster center) for the given day
3 .I ft h ea n a l y s i sd o e sn o tm e a s u r et h ec a n d i d a t e
cluster center point as being within the boundary of
any previously alerted cluster(s) for a given day (dis-
tance from candidate alert-worthy cluster center to
previously-alerted cluster center(s) is less than said
previously-alerted cluster’s radius)
4. If the event count (number of 911 calls) associated
with the candidate cluster is > 16
When an analysis of 911 call details demonstrates that
the data meet the alarm criteria, an email is transmitted
by the 911 surveillance system to local public health epi-
demiologists/disease investigators. The email notification
contains the cluster details such as the p-value, radius,
centroid, number of cases in the cluster, and the num-
ber of cases expected in the scan window. Additionally,
incident codes, HIPAA-compliant age, gender, and dis-
patch address (when available) for each case are pro-
vided for assessment of similarities by investigators. In
the event of an alarm, a set procedure as outlined in the
Water Security Initiative: Interim Guidance on Develop-
ing an Operational Strategy for Contamination Warning
Systems is implemented for alarm review and verifica-
tion of whether a water contamination incident is possi-
ble [19].
Public Health Surveillance User Interface
Upon receiving the alarm email, the investigator will log
onto a Public Health Surveillance User Interface to
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access to the analysis details for the both the 911 and
EMS surveillance systems. The 911 analysis details pro-
vided in the alarm email are included on the home
page, along with a history of 911 alarms. While location
information is provided in 911 alarm notification emails,
local public health partners requested the ability to
v i s u a l i z et h ed a t ai nag e o g r a p h i ci n f o r m a t i o ns y s t e m
(GIS) tool. Therefore, a modification was introduced
which allows system users to view alarm details by click-
ing on a link within the User Interface which provides a
GIS display. Currently, the bounding circle of the alarms
in addition to locations and select information of the
cases generating the alarms are exported in KML and
displayed in Google Earth - a free GIS platform.
Upon receipt of a 911 alarm, the public health investi-
gator will confirm proper coding of underlying data and
check other public health surveillance systems for any
corresponding trends. At this point, the investigator may
be able to determine that the alarm is not a valid contam-
ination event and close the investigation. If possible con-
tamination is still suspected, the investigator will then
contact the Water Utility Emergency Response Manager,
and convene a conference call with other public health
officials and the Drug and Poison Information Center.
This team will then discuss the data associated with the
alarm and the water utility will conduct an internal inves-
tigation and report to the public health team while fol-
lowing the utility’s Consequence Management Plan.
Results
Performance data for the 911 surveillance system was
collected from January 2008 through June 2010. Data
transmission times are provided in the analysis below, as
well as alarm characteristics, such as frequency of
alarms, number of cases in an alarm, distribution of
alarms, and alarm area.
Data Transmission
The time for data transmission, defined as the time that
elapses between upload of 911 call records to the Cin-
cinnati Fire Department server and subsequent trans-
mission time to the utility application server for
filtering, was calculated. As depicted in Figure 3, the
time for data transmission of 911 call records ranged
from 45 - 1706 minutes during the evaluation period,
with an overall average transmission time of 225.6 min-
utes (~4 hours) and an overall median time of 47.6 min-
utes. The graph demonstrates that the data transmission
time was typically between 45 and 100 minutes during
most reporting periods. Given the median data trans-
mission time, 911 alerts may be generated approximately
1 - 2 hours after call volumes had increased if indivi-
duals were exposed to contaminated water.
Occasional (seven) long delays (> 24 hours) in data
transmission were caused by network outages, which
caused downtime of the interface that transmits call
records from the Cincinnati Fire Department server to
the utility application server. Until this interface is
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Page 6 of 10manually restarted, data transmission cannot occur. Spe-
cifically, one notably long period of interface downtime
(~9 days) occurred between November 25, 2008 and
December 4, 2008, which was the result of network
instability. During this time period, transmission of all
records from the Cincinnati Fire Department server to
the utility application server was impeded. This event
noticeably increased the average transmission time for
the November 16, 2008 reporting period.
During two reporting periods later in the evaluation
timeline, longer data transmission times also occurred.
In the February 16, 2010 reporting period, the 911 inter-
face experienced a seven-day outage which delayed data
transmission. Later, in the April 16, 2010 reporting per-
iod, the utility’s 911 subscription expired, which caused
a five-day delay in data transmissions between May 1,
2010, and May 6, 2010, when the issue was resolved.
Frequency of Alarms (pre/post new alerting logic step
implementation)
To date, there have been no true alarms generated by
the 911 surveillance system. All alarms generated by the
911 surveillance system as during the evaluation period
are considered false alarms, meaning that they did not
indicate possible water contamination or other public
health events.
Prior to the addition of the fourth alerting logic step, a
total of 85 alarms were generated by the 911 surveil-
lance system, or an average of five alarms per month.
All alarms were determined to be the result of
background variability and no apparent temporal trend
in alarm frequency was observed (Figure 4).
Initially, the only limiting condition on alarm notifica-
tions was a maximum p-value of 0.025. This resulted in
detection of many statistically significant anomalies that
were of little concern to public health officials because
there were so few cases in most alarms. The SaTScan™
configuration, combined with the first three alerting
logic steps, resulted in an average of over five alarms
per month between January 2008 and May 2009. This
alarm rate was determined to be too frequent by the
public health partners; therefore, the alarm history was
examined to evaluate possible additional alerting logic
that could be applied the 911 alarm notifications.
Approximately 14 months of data was reviewed retro-
spectively to analyze factors such as p-value of the alert
clusters, cluster radius per 911 alert, and number of 911
calls per alert. Since a significant number of the alarms
contained very few cases (i.e., low number of 911 calls)
and the public health partners were most interested in
large events, the fourth alerting logic step was imple-
mented in May 2009. Historical data analysis of alarms
received indicated requiring a minimum of 17 calls for
notification would have reduced the number of alarms
received from 85 to 7 prior to implementation, which
was acceptable to the public health partners.
Following implementation of this additional alerting
criteria (post May 2009), only one 911 alarm occurred
(see Figure 5). The alarm involved 19 calls over an area
of 29 square kilometers. Notably, the lower alarm
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
9
1
1
 
A
l
a
r
m
s
Start Date of Monthly  Reporting Period
Number of Alerts
Number of Alerts - Additional Filtering Criteria
New Alerting Logic
Implemented (5/12/09)
Figure 4 911 Alarms per Reporting Period.
Haas et al. International Journal of Health Geographics 2011, 10:22
http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/10/1/22
Page 7 of 10f r e q u e n c yp o s t - M a y2 0 0 9r e d u c e st h eo v e r a l ll e v e lo f
effort expended on alarm investigations and increases
the likelihood that all alarms will be investigated (Allge-
ier S, Haas A, Pickard B: Optimizing Alarm Occurrence
in the Cincinnati Contamination Warning System, sub-
mitted). If the new alerting threshold is applied to 911
data pre-May 2009, only seven alarms would have
occurred. While the post-May 2009 alerting logic
increases the acceptability of the surveillance system by
greatly reducing the number of false alarms, it also low-
ers detection sensitivity and introduces the possibility
that events eliciting fewer than 16 calls will be missed.
Number of Calls in an Alarm
The histogram presented in Figure 6 demonstrates the
range in number of calls (i.e., cases) for alarms that
occurred during the evaluation period. Over 90% of
alarms contained 15 or fewer calls, and the central Figure 5 Google Earth Display of April 2010 911 Alarm.
Figure 6 Histogram of Number of Calls Per Alarm (n = 85).
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5 and 12 calls. The 911 surveillance system generated
an alert on September 14, 2008 during the City of Cin-
cinnati windstorm (a remnant of Hurricane Ike). This
alert contained the highest number of 911 calls of any
alert during the evaluation period - a total of 34 calls.
This alert was excluded from the histogram for visuali-
zation purposes.
Spatial Coverage of Alarms
Analysis of the geographic area covered by the 911 sur-
veillance system was conducted to examine the distribu-
tion of 911 alerts within the City of Cincinnati. The
analysis of empirical data contains a map of the surveil-
lance area with an overlay of 911 alarms that occurred
during the evaluation period.
During the evaluation period, a total of 86 alarms were
generated. Figure 7 illustrates that these alarms were spa-
tially distributed across the City of Cincinnati. Alarms
were clearly more concentrated in areas of higher popula-
tion density, as expected, since all alarms observed were
false alarms and did not indicate a possible contamination
or public health event. Most alarms were contained within
the spatial area where the population density is greater
than 1,219 individuals per square kilometer while no
alarms occurred in areas with a population density less
than 460 individuals per square kilometer.
Spatial Extent of Alarms
Analysis of 911 alarms produced during the evaluation
period demonstrates that most alarms were generated
when a few calls co-occurred within close proximity in
densely populated areas, or when many calls occurred
over larger geographic areas where fewer calls were
expected. Alarms with lower call density covered a
larger alarm area, and those with higher call density
covered a smaller alarm area.
Table 1 includes summary statistics related to the spa-
tial extent of 911 alarms that occurred during the evalua-
tion period. The alarm area represents a bounding circle
of all calls contained in an alarm. Alarm area was calcu-
lated using the alarm radius, which is the distance from
the alarm centroid (central point of all calls contained in
the alarm) to the furthest call from the centroid.
The average 911 alarm area - 9.22 square kilometers -
was small. The range in call density for 911 alarms was
0.08 - 995.22 calls per square kilometer. This range illus-
trates the upper and lower bounds of sensitivity of the 911
surveillance system based on the default alerting para-
meters. Tight call clustering is generally necessary for an
alarm to be generated, which is supported by the fact that
80% of 911 alarms encompassed an area less than 10
square kilometers in size. Furthermore, 33% of 911 alarms
covered an area less than 2 square kilometers. The histo-
gram presented in Figure 8 demonstrates that the majority
of 911 alarms covered small geographic areas. The 911
alert with the largest alarm area (253.21 square kilometers)
also had the most calls in the alarm and was excluded
Figure 7 Spatial Distribution of 911 Alarms in City of
Cincinnati (n = 86).
Table 1 Statistical Analysis of Spatial Extent of 911
Alarms (n = 86)
Alarm Area (km
2) Number of Calls Density (calls/km
2)
Average 9.22 9 28.54
Minimum < 0.0003
1 3 0.08
Maximum 253.21 34 995.22
1 The minimum alarm area was less than SaTScan’s™ minimum distance
threshold (minimum radius = 0.01 km) which translates to a minimum alarm
area of 0.0003 km
2.
Figure 8 Histogram of 911 Alarm Areas (n = 85).
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other seven alarms which met the revised alert filtering
criteria, the average alarm area was 36.36 square kilo-
meters. Expectedly, since all of the alarms were false posi-
tives, alarms featuring a greater number of calls also
covered a larger geographic area.
Conclusions
In general, the public health partners indicated that the
911 surveillance system provided timely alerts and the use
of a standardized software system by 911 call operators to
enter 911 call data allowed for consistent coding. The
speed of information (alarms containing location data)
from 911 surveillance may be valuable for detection of
fast-acting contaminants, but participants suggested that a
better understanding of the functionality of the 911 surveil-
lance system would be necessary to assess how the system
may perform during an actual contamination incident. An
increase in pre-implementation training was cited as a
major factor that would have been beneficial to the initial
process of investigating 911 alerts. One weakness identified
by the system users was the limited amount of medical
information available in the 911 alarm details. Though the
incident code for each call is available, and location data
demonstrates the degree of clustering among the cases,
there is limited additional caller information (i.e., medical
status) for investigators to consider when determining
whether an alarm suggests possible water contamination.
Despite this observation, additional surveillance systems
utilized within the public health surveillance component
may provide supplemental information that could further
inform investigations of possible water contamination inci-
dents. Furthermore, the location information included with
the alarm is sufficient to guide the investigation.
During the evaluation, no water contamination was
detected by this system or the other surveillance meth-
ods employed by the health departments which would
directly assess how well the system met the design
objective to detect fast-acting contaminants. However,
participants in this monitoring program indicated even
though an actual contamination event has not yet
occurred which would test the ability of the surveillance
system to detect an event, the speed of information
from 911 surveillance is valuable for detection of fast-
acting contaminants.
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